Home|One Step Forward, One Strike Back: The State of US-Iran Negotiations
By Nima Khorrami – NSSG Intelligence Analyst
The defining paradox of the Iran–US war has rarely been sharper than over the past two weeks: Washington and Tehran are simultaneously closer to an agreement than at any previous point and engaged in the most sustained cycle of military confrontation since the formal ceasefire. US forces struck Iranian drone infrastructure and missile sites in southern Iran on May 25-27; Iran responded with missile strikes against US bases in Bahrain and Kuwait. Escalation and diplomacy are not competing tracks; they have become complementary instruments in each side’s negotiating strategy. Assessing either in isolation produces a misleading picture of where this conflict is heading.
Iran cannot afford to lose Hezbollah. Tehran’s insistence on incorporating Lebanon into any agreement is not a procedural preference but a strategic necessity. Having failed to preserve the Assad government in Syria, Iran cannot now be seen concluding a deal that leaves Hezbollah exposed to sustained Israeli military pressure. Its claim to regional leadership, and its ability to maintain influence across its network of partners and proxies, depends on the credibility of its commitment to those it backs. A settlement that stabilises the primary US-Iran front while leaving Hezbollah vulnerable would erode that credibility at precisely the moment Tehran is trying to demonstrate its durability. Iran calculates, rightly or wrongly, that the strategic costs of such an outcome outweigh the economic benefits of a narrower agreement, and that its current leverage is sufficient to hold the line.
Iran’s domestic pressures are intensifying. The end of the 88-day internet blackout reflects economic necessity rather than any recovery of regime confidence. The Intelligence Ministry’s immediate warnings about Starlink and foreign media make clear that the regime is as anxious about the political consequences of restored connectivity as it was about sustaining the blackout itself. Historically, the Islamic Republic has demonstrated a significant capacity to absorb economic hardship. What it faces now is harder: the convergence of rising unemployment, accelerating inflation, and deep-rooted public discontent creates compounding pressures that are more difficult to manage than any single crisis. This is one important reason Tehran is insisting on immediate access to at least 50% of its frozen and blocked assets as part of any deal; the regime needs liquidity, and it needs it soon.
Domestic anxiety is the underreported GCC story. One of the most significant developments across the Gulf over the past two weeks has been the growing emphasis on internal resilience. In the UAE, a government-led national cohesion campaign signals concern about maintaining social unity amid a conflict that has repeatedly brought Iranian fire to Emirati soil. Bahrain’s decision to ban its citizens from travelling to Iraq and Iran represents a notable expansion of domestic control. Economic pressures are also becoming more visible across the region. Against this backdrop, the UAE’s shift in posture is particularly telling: after months of deliberately charting an independent foreign policy course, Abu Dhabi is now calling for a more unified GCC response to Iranian attacks.
Analysis
An agreement may be in the making but its significance should not be overstated. The framework under discussion is less a settlement than a 60-day negotiating mandate that is deliberately ambiguous enough for both sides to claim success to their respective domestic audiences. The more consequential contest will begin the moment signatures are exchanged, centring on implementation, sequencing, verification, and competing interpretations of what was actually agreed. A signed memorandum should therefore be read as the opening of a new phase of uncertainty, not a definitive risk-off signal. Both sides are also likely to use any negotiating window to reinforce their positions, and the US political calendar will not moderate that dynamic. After November’s midterms, Trump’s electoral constraints diminish regardless of outcome. A Republican victory would sharpen his determination to ‘finish the job’ on his own terms; a defeat would shift his focus toward legacy and away from political popularity. In either scenario, and bar any major developments, the structural incentives for renewed pressure on Iran are likely to increase, not ease, in the months that follow.